This paper analyzes prominence in a homogeneous product market where two …rms simultaneously choose both prices and price complexity levels. Complexity limits competing o¤ers' comparability and results in consumer confusion. Confused consumers are more likely to buy from the prominent …rm. In equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices and price complexity. The nature of equilibrium depends on prominence. Compared to its rival, the prominent …rm makes higher pro…t, associates a smaller price range with lowest complexity, puts lower probability on lowest complexity, and sets a higher average price.
Introduction
Price complexity is a common feature of many markets, including those for retail …nancial and banking products, and retail supply of gas and electricity. It stems from the use of multi-part tari¤s or partitioned prices, involved or technical language, or di¤erent price formats or information disclosure methods. A main concern is that complex pricing sti ‡es competition by making it harder for consumers to understand …rms' o¤ers and by limiting product comparability.
The 2015 UK Competition and Market Authority investigation of the retail banking market found that " [t] here are barriers to accessing and assessing information on Personal Current Account charges" and "overdraft charges are particularly di¢cult to compare across banks, due to both the complexity and diversity of the banks' charging structures". 1 The 2011 report by the UK Independent Commission on Banking mentions "evidence that complexity in pricing structures makes it di¢cult for consumers to receive good value". The 2007 EC study of EU mortgage credit markets and Woodward and Hall's 2012 study of US mortgage markets echo these concerns. 2 Price complexity increases the time (or e¤ort) consumers need to make a choice and the level of cognitive abilities and sophistication required to identify the best deal. So, it may lead to consumer confusion and allow homogeneous product sellers to soften price competition and increase their pro…ts. 3 Experimental research indicates that more fragmented multi-part tari¤s can create confusion and lead to suboptimal consumer choices (see, for instance, Kalayci and Potters, 2011, and Kalayci, 2015) . These …ndings are consistent with evidence from the marketing literature that partitioned (or involved) pricing makes it di¢cult for consumers to compare competing o¤ers (Greenleaf et al., 2013, reviews related work) . 4 Evidence of behavioral biases has also been found in US retail …nance products (mortgage brokerage, loans, and credit card services) by Woodward and Hall (2012) and Stango and Zinman (2009a, 2009b) .
In some markets where price complexity limits the comparability of competing o¤ers, the choices of confused consumers are a¤ected by …rm prominence, which may be due to higher 1 Similarly, in the market for business current accounts "while price information is available, it is di¢cult for SMEs to compare fees across banks" and this is due to "complex tari¤ structures", amongst other factors. See the 2015 Summary of Provisional Findings Report of the Retail Banking Market Investigation.
2 Carlin (2009) discusses empirical evidence of price complexity in …nancial markets and concludes that "many of the households who purchase retail …nancial products do not understand what they are buying and how much they are paying for these goods".
3 When facing complex tari¤s/markets, some consumers may rationally opt out of information processing due to its high cost. Or, they may be unable to deal with the complexity because they have poor numeracy skills and/or misjudge the information. 4 See also Estelami (1997) , Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson (1998) , and Thomas and Morwitz (2009). brand recognition (e.g., for a pioneer or incumbent product or an intensely advertised one), to product recommendations made by an expert, agent, or other consumers, to a more salient location (at eye-level, in a display, or at the top of an online search-outcome list), or to consumers' loyalty to an already familiar brand. 5 For instance, consumers who shop for a mortgage or for insurance may be biased towards considering their current-account bank. In retail energy markets that were previously monopolized, consumers may favor the 'familiar' regional incumbent over new entrants (see Giulietti, Waterson, and Wildenbeest, 2014 , for evidence from British electricity markets). 6 This paper explores the relationship between price complexity as an obfuscation device and …rm prominence and its implications in otherwise homogeneous product markets. We analyze the impact of prominence on …rms' pricing and complexity choices and on market outcomes, and build on the interplay between complexity and prominence to propose a conceptual microfoundation for consumer confusion. In our model, a prominent seller and its rival compete for a unit mass of identical consumers with unit demands. Firms simultaneously and independently choose both their prices and price-complexity levels. The timing re ‡ects the fact that in many environments, including banking and …nancial markets, …rms can change relatively easily the price formats or the technical language employed in their price disclosures.
We formalize price complexity by allowing each …rm to select a level from a closed interval. A …rm's choice of complexity a¤ects consumers' ability to understand its price o¤er and, although it does not a¤ect the complexity of the rival's price, it may limit the comparability of competing o¤ers. More precisely, a marginal increase in a …rm's complexity level increases the share of confused consumers in the market. So, complexity a¤ects market composition: some consumers are experts, while others are confused. Confused consumers are unable to compare the …rms' prices and make random choices, but are relatively more likely to select the prominent product as it enjoys higher recognition. 7 In Carlin (2009) , confused consumers make random choices, so each …rm is equally likely to be selected. In this respect, our model is an asymmetric version of his and an extension where we explore alternative confusion technologies generalizes his …ndings. In our benchmark model, the experts purchase the lowest-price product, but we also 5 Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) review empirical evidence on prominence. 6 In an analysis of Mexico's private social security market, Hastings, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2017) show that …rms' advertising and sales spending (which can be related to prominence) a¤ects the choices of lowincome or price-inelastic consumers. Using household-level data from the Texas residential electricity market, Hortaçsu, Madanizadeh, and Puller (2017) show that inattention and incumbent brands' advantages are sources of consumer inertia. 7 Due to confusion, the confused may use intermediaries who steer them towards the prominent product, may rely on persuasive advertisements, or may have stronger default biases. discuss a variant where they are biased towards the prominent product.
In this setting, …rms have to balance con ‡icting incentives when setting their prices: to compete aggressively for the experts and to exploit the confused. In equilibrium, this friction rules out pure strategy pricing, so both …rms randomize on prices. The prominent …rm also randomizes between the lowest and the highest price complexity levels and, for moderate levels of prominence, so does the less prominent seller. However, if the prominence level is high enough, the less prominent seller chooses the lowest complexity for sure as it bene…ts more from market transparency. In equilibrium, whenever a …rm randomizes on complexity, there is a positive relationship between prices and complexity levels. 8 When setting a low price, a …rm bene…ts from a lower complexity level as this is associated with a higher fraction of experts. In contrast, when a …rm sets a high price, it may bene…t from choosing a high complexity level, provided that it serves a large enough fraction of confused consumers.
The …rms' equilibrium mixed price and complexity strategies re ‡ect the di¤erences in product salience. The prominent seller makes higher pro…ts, chooses the highest price-complexity level with higher probability than the rival, sets a lower cut-o¤ price below which prices are associated with the lowest complexity, and chooses the monopoly price with positive probability.
As it sells to a larger share of confused consumers, the salient …rm is more likely to choose high complexity and also, for a given complexity level, its incentive to set a high price is stronger.
The less prominent seller's price is always below the monopoly level and its average price is lower than that of the rival.
In our model, an increase in prominence may lead to lower industry pro…ts and so consumers could be better o¤ in a market where one …rm is salient enough. Intuitively, for high enough prominence, the less salient …rm chooses the lowest complexity for sure and competes more aggressively in prices. This suggests that in markets where less prominent …rms (e.g. new entrants) can increase the relative prominence of their products (for instance, through advertising investments or sales e¤orts), this could be detrimental to consumers. Giulietti, Waterson, and Wildenbeest (2014) show that, between 2002 and 2005, in the British electricity market, the lower the share of households buying electricity through the incumbents (which enjoy higher prominence at regional level), the less competitively the market entrants behave.
Furthermore, we show that, conditional on choosing lowest complexity, the prominent …rm's average price is lower. Therefore, when consumers are most able to understand the …rms' prices (when complexity is lowest), the prominent …rm appears to be o¤ering a better deal. In this sense, confused consumers' bias for the prominent seller is consistent with the ranking of the average prices conditional on low complexity.
We show that our qualitative results are robust in a modi…ed model where expert consumers are biased towards the prominent …rm's product (i.e. willing to pay a premium for it so long as the price is below their valuation). 9 Using an example, we illustrate the existence of an equilibrium where …rms randomize on both prices and price complexity levels, there is a positive relationship between prices, and -conditional on choosing the lowest complexity level -the prominent …rm's average price is lower. We also show that such a mixed strategy equilibrium exists for more general confusion technologies whenever the marginal e¤ect of a …rm's price complexity increases in the rival's complexity choice.
In spite of their prevalence, price complexity and prominence have only recently received attention in the economics literature. Carlin (2009) analyzes a homogeneous product market where identical …rms compete in both prices and price complexity levels, and where confused consumers make random choices, so each …rm is equally likely to be selected. His …ndings are consistent with observed patterns in retail …nancial markets, such as price dispersion, positive mark-ups, and higher prices in more fragmented environments. Our analysis incorporates prominence into his framework and focuses on its interaction with complexity. Gu and Wenzel (2014) analyze consumer protection policy in a model where two …rms compete in prices after committing to an obfuscation level. In their model, unlike ours, obfuscation is a long-run decision so it could be related, for instance, to product design rather than price format which may be changed relatively easily. 10 Allowing for prominence, they show that in equilibrium the salient …rm chooses the highest obfuscation level for sure, while the rival's (deterministic) choice depends on the market conditions.
In a duopoly models where …rms compete in prices and price-frames, Piccione and Spiegler (2012) study the impact of frame-structure on market outcomes. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) explore in a uni…ed framework the e¤ects of both price complexity and price presentation format di¤erentiation as sources of consumer confusion. We show that the nature of the equilibrium depends on the source of confusion and that in oligopoly markets a standard competition policy 9 An alternative interpretation of this extension is that consumers exhibit a default bias and, although the experts can correctly compare prices, they face a switching cost.
1 0 See also Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) , Wilson (2010) , and Taylor (2017) for search-cost models of obfuscation. The latter explores an alternative rationale for obfuscation: raising 'browsing' costs allows …rms to target better merchandising e¤orts by excluding from the market 'window-shoppers' who are unlikely to purchase. approach may have undesired e¤ects.
In a sequential search model where all consumers sample …rst one salient …rm, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) demonstrate that, with homogeneous products, the prominent …rm sets a lower price than its rivals, industry pro…ts are higher, and consumer surplus and welfare lower than in a market where …rms are equally prominent. They also show that prominence bene…ts both sellers and consumers when products are vertically di¤erentiated (as the highestquality producer has the strongest incentive to become salient) and discuss the empirical relevance of prominence. Armstrong and Zhou (2011) explore ways in which a …rm can become prominent. More speci…cally, intermediaries may steer consumers to one …rm for a fee, price advertisements may a¤ect the order in which …rms' o¤ers are sampled, or consumers' default biases may be a source of prominence. 11
In our clearinghouse setting, the order of search is irrelevant but prominence a¤ects the behavior of consumers who are confused by price complexity. With both complexity and prominence, consumers' perceptions of prices may be biased as they may ignore the involved prices they cannot understand and take into account only those prices that are presented in less complex formats. In our model, a bias in favor of the prominent seller is consistent with such a 'myopic' assessment. We focus on environments where …rms commonly employ complex prices, for example, consumer banking and energy retail markets. Prominence might be driven by default biases favouring the product under consideration or related ones or it may be due to persuasive advertising or marketing ploys which could make a …rm's product salient in a consumer's mind and so more likely to be considered.
By considering the interplay between complexity and prominence in a model with consumer confusion, this study contributes to an emerging literature that explores the interaction between boundedly rational consumers and strategic …rms. See Ellison (2006) , Spiegler (2011 ), Huck and Zhou (2011 ), Grubb (2015 , and Spiegler (2016) for related discussions and surveys of recent work. Our model is also related to the literature on price dispersion (see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2006 , for a review) and explores a market where …rms simultaneously choose prices and complexity, and randomize in both dimensions.
Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with two sellers, …rms 1 and 2. The …rms face zero marginal costs of production. There is a unit mass of consumers, each demanding at most one unit of the product and willing to pay up to v = 1. The …rms compete by simultaneously and independently choosing prices (p 1 and p 2 ) and price complexity levels (k 1 and k 2 ). The timing re ‡ects the fact that in many cases both complexity and prices can be changed relatively easily. The level of complexity k i captures how di¢cult it is for consumers to assess the price of …rm i and a¤ects the comparability of competing o¤ers. The …rms set prices p i 2 [0; 1] and can choose any complexity level k i 2 [k; k] R + free of cost.
Depending on …rms' complexity choices, some consumers may …nd it di¢cult to correctly compare the competing price o¤ers. More precisely, for given k 1 and k 2 , a fraction (k 1 ; k 2 ) 1 of the consumers are able to accurately compare the price o¤ers and select the best deal (we refer to these as the 'experts' or 'informed'), but the remaining 1 (k 1 ; k 2 ) consumers are confused and make random choices, which may be biased due to …rm prominence. Let (k 1 ; k 2 ) 2 C 2 .
If one …rm unilaterally increases the complexity of its price, this lowers the fraction of expert consumers in the market (@ =@k i < 0, for i = 1; 2), but does not a¤ect the marginal impact of the rival's price complexity on consumers (@ 2 =@k 1 @k 2 = 0). For simplicity, we assume
That is, nobody gets confused if both …rms choose the lowest complexity level k, in which case all consumers buy the cheaper product. 12 In section 5 we explore the robustness of our results for alternative confusion technologies with
We focus on the interaction between price complexity and …rm prominence. In our model, prominence is exogenous (it may be due, for instance, to higher …rm recognition or perceived trustworthiness) and has an impact on product choice when consumers are confused by price complexity. It also a¤ects the choice of informed consumers if the two …rms o¤er the same price. 13 More speci…cally, without loss of generality, …rm 1 is a 'prominent' seller and the consumers who are unable to compare the prices due to complexity are more likely to purchase its product. That is, a fraction 2 (1=2; 1) of the confused consumers buy from …rm 1 and the remaining 1 buy from …rm 2. Similarly, if both …rms o¤er the same price, a fraction 2 (1=2; 1) of the experts buy from …rm 1 and the remaining 1 buy from …rm 2. As a result, …rms pro…ts are
where q i (p i ; p j ) is given by
1; if p i < p j and p i 1
for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j ;
with s 1 = > 1=2 and s 2 = 1 .
We assume that the confused are unable to compare the …rms' o¤ers, however they do not pay more than their reservation price (v = 1). 14 One interpretation is that consumers have a budget constraint and realize at checkout (or after purchase) if a product's price exceeds their valuation and can decline to buy or return the product. Knowing this, …rms do not have incentives to set prices above consumers' valuation. 15 In our model, for simplicity, confused consumers' choices are a¤ected by complexity and prominence, but are independent of how the two …rms' prices rank overall. This captures the idea that confusion in price comparisons reduces consumers' price sensitivity and weakens price competition. Also, consumers do not have an opportunity to learn and infer prices from a …rm's complexity choice. This is more relevant in mortgage or …nancial services markets, for example, where the consumers participate infrequently. Moreover, in our setting, confused consumers' bias in favour of the prominent …rm is consistent with the ranking of the average prices associated with the lowest complexity.
Preliminary Analysis
We start by analyzing …rms' price and complexity choices when the price format limits the comparability of competing o¤ers and one …rm is prominent. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to the appendix, unless speci…ed otherwise. The following two results rule out the existence of pure strategy equilibria.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium where both …rms choose pure price-complexity strategies.
Proof. Suppose …rm i (j 6 = i ) chooses a deterministic complexity level k i (k j ).
, and …rms compete à la Bertrand and make zero pro…ts. But then …rm i could pro…tably deviate to k d i = k 0 > k and a price p i = 1 which would result in positive pro…ts as there would be a non-trivial mass of confused consumers (i.e., 1 (k 0 ; k) > 0). Hence, it must be that in any candidate equilibrium at least one …rm (w.l.o.g. let it be i) chooses k i > k.
(ii) By (i) for any candidate equilibrium pro…le of price complexities (k i ; k j ), some consumers are Baye et al., 1992) , and …rm i makes pro…t i =
So, there can be no equilibrium where both …rms choose pure price complexity strategies.
Lemma 1 implies that in any candidate equilibrium at least one …rm randomizes on complexity levels. As a result, the …rms face two di¤erent types of consumers, confused and experts. 16 There is a con ‡ict between the incentive to extract all surplus from confused consumers, and the incentive to reduce price and compete for informed consumers. This intuition underlies the following result, whose proof is standard and therefore omitted (see Varian, 1980, and Rosenthal, 1980) .
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium where both …rms use pure pricing strategies.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in any duopoly equilibrium there must be dispersion in both prices and complexity levels. Firm i's strategy space is
…rm i's mixed strategy for i = 1; 2. i is a bivariate c.d.f. and can be written as i =
f.s they should be increasing on their supports.
1 6 We focus on a case where (k; k) = 1. However, Lemma 1 is robust for (k; k) < 1 so long as @ =@ki < 0, for i = 1; 2. In that case, even for ki = kj = k, …rms face both experts and confused and so in the candidate price equilibrium,
As at least one of the …rms chooses ki > k, part (ii) in the proof of Lemma 1 applies.
1 7 If the two random variables, pi and ki are independent, Hi(ki j pi) = Hi(ki).
Suppose …rm i 6 = j chooses a price p i and complexity level k i . Firm i's expected pro…t, which depends on …rm i's choices and on the rival's mixed strategy j , can be written as
The expected base of confused consumers is presented in the second square brackets in i (p i ; k i ; j ).
The remaining consumers form the expected base of experts. But, expert consumers purchase from …rm i only when it o¤ers a lower price than its rival. The expected number of informed consumers, conditional on …rm i being the low price seller, is presented in the …rst square brackets. Firm i serves a share s i of the expected base of confused. The …rst derivative of
. k i is presented below using Leibniz's Rule. The equality follows from the
Then, as @ (k i ; k j )=@k i < 0, to maximize its expected-pro…t …rm i chooses
where the threshold price b p i is implicitly de…ned by F j (b p i ) = 1 s i , whenever b p i belongs to the support of F j . Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the cut-o¤ prices b p i belongs to the support of the rival's price distribution function, as at least one …rm mixes on complexity levels. The next result summarizes these …ndings.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, a …rm's complexity choice depends only on its price. Firm i chooses its price according to a c.d.f.
, …rm i chooses a deterministic complexity level, but then it must be that the …rm j randomizes on prices (i.e. b p j 2 T i ).
When a …rm mixes on complexity levels in equilibrium, there is a positive relationship between prices and complexity. More speci…cally, if b p i 2 T j , at all prices below the cut-o¤ level b p i , …rm i chooses the lowest complexity and at all prices above b p i , it chooses the highest complexity level. Intuitively, when a …rm chooses a relatively high price, its incentive to choose high complexity is stronger as it relies more on selling to confused consumers. In contrast, when setting a relatively low price, a …rm has a stronger incentive to choose low complexity as this results in a larger base of experts.
Lemmas 3 properties, we …rst analyze a situation where both …rms randomize on complexity levels, and so the cut-o¤ prices de…ned in Proposition 1 must satisfy b
implies that …rm i = 1; 2 chooses complexity level k with probability F i (b p i ) and complexity level k with probability 1
where j = 1; 2, i 6 = j, and s j is …rm j's share of consumers confused by complexity. Recall that s 1 = > 1=2 and s 2 = 1 . For expositional simplicity, denote:
Consistency requires that
The following condition holds when both …rms mix on both prices and complexity levels in equilibrium.
the resulting values of 1 and 2 are inconsistent. 19
Below we illustrate the derivation of …rm 1's expected pro…t for p 2 [p 0 ; b p 1 ). By Proposition 1, …rm 1 associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its expected pro…t is
With probability F 2 (b p 2 ), …rm 2 chooses k, so that there are (k; k) experts and 1 (k; k) confused consumers. A share of the confused purchases from …rm 1, the prominent seller.
Informed consumers purchase from …rm 1 if …rm 2's price is higher, which happens with prob-
. With probability 1 F 2 (b p 2 ), …rm 2 chooses k and there are (k; k)
informed and 1 (k; k) confused consumers. All the informed purchase from …rm 1 as it o¤ers a lower price (…rm 2 associates k with prices higher than b p 2 ) and so does a share of the confused. The …rst two terms in curly brackets capture the expected number of experts, while the term in square brackets gives the expected number of confused consumers.
In appendix A.2, we present …rm 1's expected pro…ts at p 0 and when p ! b p 1 . In the same appendix, we derive …rm 1's expected pro…t for p 2 [b p 1 ; b p 2 ] and p 2 (b p 2 ; 1], and …rm 2's expected pro…t over the three price ranges. Next section builds on these derivations to characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium and to identify a condition on the parameter values under which both …rms randomize on both prices and complexity levels in equilibrium. When this condition does not hold -which happens when …rm 1's level of prominence is relatively high -both …rms mix on prices, but only the prominent …rm randomizes on complexity levels.
Duopoly Equilibrium
In equilibrium, …rm i's expected pro…t for any price-complexity combination (p; k i ), which is assigned positive density in equilibrium, must be constant. Then, using expressions (A1) -(A4), (A7) and (A8) in appendix A.2, we can write price ratios p 0 = b p 1 and p 0 = b p 2 as functions
, …rm 2's probability of choosing k in equilibrium, and 1 = F 1 (b p 1 ), …rm 1's probability of choosing k in equilibrium. These ratios are presented in appendix A.3. We then obtain the equilibrium values of 1 and 2 ,
It can be checked that 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 > 0. Furthermore, 2 < 1 holds i¤ the following condition is satis…ed.
For relatively low levels of prominence (that is, for 2 (0:5; 0:71)), this condition always holds and so …rm 2 mixes between the highest and the lowest price complexity levels.
More generally, for a given (k; k), the condition is satis…ed when …rm 1's level of prominence is not too high. However, Condition 2 gets more stringent as …rm 1's prominence increases (the LHS of the inequality in the condition is decreasing in ). When …rm 1 is prominent enough, …rm 2 bene…ts more from price transparency, as its share of confused consumers is relatively small.
In appendix A.3, we show that when i 2 (0; 1), the consistency requirements also hold Condition 2. Finally, we present the equilibrium cut-o¤ prices in expressions (A10) and (A11) and the pricing c.d.f.s of the two …rms. Using (A1), (A5), and (2), we obtain the equilibrium pro…t of …rm 1, 1 and the lower bound of the price support, p 0 .
Then, using p 0 and (A7), we calculate …rm 2's equilibrium pro…t,
Note that 1 = 2 = 2 = = (1 )= 1 .
Below we summarize our …ndings.
Proposition 2 Under Condition 2, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium …rm i chooses the lowest complexity k with probability i = F i (b p i ) 2 (0; 1), de…ned in (2) and highest complexity k with probability 1 i . Both …rms randomize on prices in [p 0 ; 1], with p 0 given in (4). When …rm 1's prominence is not too high in the sense that > 1=2, but Condition 2 is satis…ed, both …rms randomize on complexity levels and prices in equilibrium. In this case, the di¤erence in the …rms' shares of confused consumers is not too large. In the limit, when Example 1 When = :6 and (k; k) = :6, in equilibrium …rm 1 and 2 choose k with probability 1 = :357 and 2 = :672, respectively. The two …rms randomize on prices according to the following c.d.f.s, which are illustrated in Figure 1 ,
and F 2 (p) = When condition 2 does not hold, the results in Proposition 2 no longer apply as 2 1. In this case, because …rm 1's prominence advantage is large enough, …rm 2 serves a relatively small share of confused consumers. Then …rm 2 relies more on expert consumers and so bene…ts more from market transparency than from confusion. We prove the following result in appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 When Condition 2 does not hold, in the unique mixed strategy equilibrium …rm 2 chooses k for sure and …rm 1 chooses the lowest complexity k with probability
) and the highest complexity k with probability 1 h 1 , where
Both …rms randomize on prices in
The equilibrium pro…ts are given by
Thus, when prominence is large enough, …rm 2 chooses the lowest complexity for sure to minimize the number of confused buyers and reduce its disadvantage. The prominent …rm, as before, associates lower prices with the lowest complexity (at those prices it bene…ts from more transparency) and higher prices with highest complexity (at those prices it relies more on confused consumers). More speci…cally, …rm 1 chooses complexity k for all prices p < b p h 1 2 (p h 0 ; 1), and k for all prices p b p h 1 . Proposition 1 then requires that …rms' pricing c.d.f.s satisfy
. 20 The following example and Figure 2 illustrate the results for relatively high prominence.
Example 2 When = :8 and (k; k) = :6, in equilibrium …rm 1 chooses k with probability h 1 = :145, while …rm 2 chooses k for sure. The two …rms randomize on prices according to the following c.d.f.s, which are illustrated in Figure 2 ,
, where p h 0 = :32 and b p h 1 = :4. Firm 1 makes pro…t h1 = :32 and …rm 2 makes pro…t h2 = :232. Firm 1's atom at p = 1 is h = :274. However, when Condition 2 does not hold and so …rm 1 is prominent enough, both …rm 1's pro…t ( h1 ) and total industry pro…t ( h1 + h2 ) are strictly increasing in . 21 As total surplus is constant, this implies that consumer surplus decreases in in this case. When Condition 2 holds and …rm 1's level of prominence is relatively low, …rm 2's pro…t 2 is strictly decreasing in and consumer surplus in not monotonic in . 22 Figure 3 illustrates individual and aggregate pro…ts as functions of the level of prominence in a numerical example where (k; k) = 0:6; in this case, total industry pro…t is lowest and consumers surplus highest at = 0:754 which is the cut-o¤ prominence value for the two types of equilibria presented in Propositions 2 and 3.
Example 3 Suppose (k; k) = 0:6. Then, Condition 2 holds i¤ 2 (0:5; 0:754). Firm 1's probability of choosing the lowest complexity ( 1 ) decreases in . Firm 2's probability of choosing the lowest complexity ( 2 ) weakly increases in : 2 strictly increases in when Condition 2 holds and it is constant otherwise. It can also be shown that the lower bound of the …rms' price support is not monotonic in , while the cut-o¤ prices of …rm 1 and 2, respectively, are weakly decreasing and increasing in . 23 The likelihood that the prominent …rm chooses the monopoly price strictly increases in .
Combining the results in Propositions 2 and 3, we analyze next the role of prominence.
Corollary 1 In the mixed strategy equilibrium, (i) the more prominent …rm makes higher pro…ts than the rival; (ii) the price distribution of the prominent …rm …rst order stochastically dominates the one of the less prominent …rm; (iii) the more prominent …rm's average price is 2 1 Denote by h (= h1 + h2 ) total industry pro…ts when Condition 2 does not hold. Then higher than that of the less prominent …rm, and (iv) the less prominent …rm chooses the lowest complexity (k) with higher probability than the rival.
The prominent …rm attracts a larger share of confused consumers, and so it bene…ts more from market-wide confusion. For this reason, it chooses the highest level of complexity with higher probability than its rival, has lower incentives to compete for the expert consumers, and therefore it chooses a higher average price. The combined e¤ect of charging higher prices (in the …rst order stochastic dominance sense) and attracting a higher share of the confused consumers allows the prominent …rm to make higher pro…ts in equilibrium. Confused consumers' bias in favor of the prominent …rm appears to be inconsistent with the ranking of the average prices.
However, our next result shows that their behavior is consistent with the ranking of the average prices, conditional on these being associated with the lowest complexity (k).
Corollary 2 Consumer Confusion. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the more prominent …rm chooses a lower cut-o¤ price -below which it uses the lowest level of price complexity kthan its rival (b p 1 < b p 2 when Condition 2 holds and b p h 1 < b p h 2 when it does not). Furthermore, conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the more prominent …rm o¤ers a lower average price than its rival (E(p 1 j p 1 < b p 1 ) < E(p 2 j p 2 < b p 2 ) when Condition 2 holds, and
We prove this corollary in appendix A.5 and sketch here the intuition. Conditional on pricing strictly below the monopoly level (p = 1), the price c.d.f.s of the two …rms are identical.
This can be seen in Examples 1 and 2. Combined with the fact that, in equilibrium, the cut-o¤ price below which …rm 1 chooses k is lower than the corresponding cut-o¤ of …rm 2 (that is,
Condition 2 holds, and b p h 1 < b p h 2 , if it does not), this proves the corollary. One interpretation of our model is that understanding a price associated with the high complexity level k is costly for the consumers (e.g., requires time or e¤ort). Consumers may opt out of this costly evaluation process, in which case they end up confused and randomize their choice. In contrast, understanding a price associated with the low complexity level k is costless. As the cost of evaluating two prices associated with k is higher than that of evaluating one, more consumers are confused when both …rms use k than when only one does (which is consistent with 1 ( k; k) > 1 (k; k)). 24 Consider a consumer who looks for the lowest expected price available in the market and can assess prices associated with k, but not those associated with k. Then, conditional on k, the prominent …rm's expected price is lower than that of the rival and so the consumer is more likely to choose its product. 25 If the confused 2 4 See also Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) for a related discussion. 2 5 Consumers may gather information on prices through recommendations on online forums or social networks. Transparent-price o¤ers may be more likely to be recommended as more people understand them and they are consumers are 'myopic' in this sense and only take into account the average price conditional on it being associated with the lowest price complexity level, the prominent …rm enjoys a larger share of confused consumers. Such behavior could be further related to a stochastic utility model in which confused consumers 'approximate' the surplus from …rm i's product to v E(p i j p i < b p i )+" i , where " i is a random variable that captures confusion due to complexity.
For a thorough discussion of this class of models, see Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) .
Extensions

Biased Experts
This part explores the robustness of our results in a modi…ed model where experts' choices are also a¤ected by …rm prominence. More speci…cally, although expert consumers are able to assess prices correctly, they are biased in favor of the prominent …rm and purchase its product so long as p 1 < p 2 + d, where p i is …rm i's price, for i = 1; 2, d 2 (0; 1) is a 'prominence premium', and p 1 < 1. Like before, consumers' valuation for the product is not a¤ected by prominence (i.e., they face a budget constraint). But, so long as the price does not exceed their valuation (v = 1), the experts are ready to pay a premium for the prominent brand. 26 This set-up could also be interpreted as one where consumers have a default-bias and, although they can correctly compare prices, the experts have switching cost d.
We show in appendix A.6 that if …rm j employs a mixed strategy
is the marginal c.d.f. of …rm j's random price de…ned on support T b j and H b j (k j j p j ) is the conditional c.d.f. of …rm j's complexity level, then it is a best response for …rm i to randomize on price complexity levels. We provide there further discussion using a numerical example which illustrates that, for some values of d, there is an equilibrium where (i) …rms randomize on both prices and complexity levels, (ii) prices below (above) a cut-o¤ level are associated with the lowest (highest) complexity, and (iii) the average price of the prominent …rm conditional on using the lowest complexity is lower than that of the rival. So, in line with our main analysis, there is a positive relationship between prices and price complexity levels and consumers' bias in favour of the prominent …rm is consistent with the ranking of average prices that …rms o¤er with the lowest complexity. associated with relatively low prices. Based on this, the o¤ers of the prominent …rm may appear to be better.
2 6 However, like in our benchmark analysis, empirical evidence suggests that prominence is more likely to a¤ect confused consumers rather than the experts. In a study of physically homogeneous products (including health products and retail food and drinks), Bronnenberg, Dubé, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2015) …nd that expert consumers are considerably less likely than average consumers to pay a premium for branded products.
Alternative Confusion Technologies
The main analysis assumes that a marginal increase in …rm i's complexity reduces the fraction of experts in the market but does not alter the e¤ectiveness of the rival's marginal increase in price complexity on consumers, that is, @ 2 =@k 1 @k 2 = 0. Below we prove that there exists an equilibrium which is qualitatively consistent with the one in the main analysis whenever @ 2 =@k 1 @k 2 > 0. As @ =@k i = i < 0, this condition requires that the magnitude of the marginal impact of …rm i's complexity be decreasing in …rm j's complexity (@ j i j =@k j < 0). 27 More speci…cally, we show that if the rival uses a mixed strategy with a positive relationship between price and price complexity, it is a best response for a …rm to associate prices below a threshold with the lowest complexity and prices above it with the highest complexity.
Suppose …rm j uses a mixed strategy j so that dk j (p j )=dp j 0. Consider the expected pro…ts of …rm i presented in section 3:
The f.o.c. of …rm i's expected pro…t maximization w.r.t. k i requires that
where
gives the marginal impact of k i on and
is the expected marginal impact of an increase in k i on the fraction of experts conditional on …rm j's price being higher than p i . For given j , R 1 p 0 E( i (p j ))dF j (p j ) -the overall expected marginal impact of an increase in k i on the fraction of experts -is a constant. At p i = p 0 , the term in brackets becomes (1
and when p i ! 1, it converges to s i
where the equality follows from Leibniz's Rule. As
Hence, whenever @ 2 =@k i @k j > 0 there exists a unique b p i 2 (p 0 ; 1) which satis…es (7) and it follows that …rm i's complexity level choice is
whenever b p i belongs to T j the support of F j . Lemma 1 implies that at least one of the cut-o¤ prices b p i belongs to T j . This shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium like the one analyzed in our benchmark model exists for a more general confusion technology.
Conclusions
We analyze the interplay between consumer confusion due to price complexity and …rm prominence in a model where two …rms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and the complexity of their price o¤ers. One of the …rms enjoys a higher level of prominence, which may be due to higher brand recognition, industry dynamics, or advertising e¤ort/spending. Price complexity limits the comparability of …rms' price o¤ers and so, in its presence, some consumers are informed of all prices and able to identify the best o¤er, while the others may get confused and are unable to assess …rms' o¤ers. Firms' price complexity choices determine the share of confused consumers. These consumers shop at random and favour the more prominent …rm, in the sense that they are more likely to buy from it.
In equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices and complexity levels. The nature of the equilibrium depends on the level of prominence. For moderate levels of prominence, both …rms mix on price complexity levels, while for high levels of prominence, the less prominent …rm chooses the lowest price complexity. The prominent …rm makes higher pro…ts, chooses higher prices on average and the lowest complexity level with lower probability, and sets the monopoly price with positive probability. However, a decrease in prominence may increase industry pro…ts and harm consumers. In addition, conditional on choosing the lowest complexity, the prominent …rm sets a lower price, on average, which is consistent with confused consumers' behavior. The perceptions of these consumers may be biased because they ignore complex prices and consider only the most transparent ones.
We show that our results are robust in a setting where the expert consumers are also biased towards the prominent …rm and so willing to pay a premium. We also …nd that a qualitatively similar equilibrium exists with alternative confusion technologies if the marginal impact of an increase in one …rm's price complexity increases in the rival's complexity level. Our framework may be used to endogeneize …rm prominence, analyze oligopoly market outcomes, or explore the role of complexity in markets where price format di¤erentiation, rather than complexity, is a source of confusion.
A Appendix
A.1 Properties of the Pricing Distribution Functions
Lemma 3 The supports of the pricing c.d.f.s, T 1 and T 2 are both connected intervals (i.e., there are no gaps in either of them).
Proof. Let e T 1 and e T 2 be the convex hulls of T 1 and T 2 , respectively. Let e T = e
and p a = max A and p 0 = sup G. Clearly, p a 2 T i for at least one i and
Lemma 4 Neither …rm can have a mass point in the interior or at the lower bound of the other one's price c.d.f. support. Moreover, …rm i cannot have a mass point at the upper bound of T j if …rm j has a mass point there.
Proof. Suppose …rm j has a mass point at some p 0 2 T j with p 0 < max T j . It must be that p 0 2 T i , otherwise …rm j would have incentives to move the mass point to a higher price. Then, …rm i is better o¤ deviating to p 0 as there is a discrete increase in market share and only a marginal decrease in price. Recall that (k 1 ; k 2 ) > 0, that is, there are always some price aware consumers. The above argument applies also at p 0 = max T j , so that both …rms cannot have a mass point at the upper bound of j's support.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, it must hold that
and let p 00 = min A. Then, i (p 00 ; k i ; j ) > i (p 0 ; k i ; j ) as …rm i does not lose any market share when deviating from p 0 to p 00 . If A = ?, then it must be that p 0 > max T j . If p 0 < 1, then a similar argument to the one above applies and i (1;
Lemma 4 implies that at least one of the …rms does not have a mass point at max T j : Then, that …rm can pro…tably deviate to p 0 = 1 from p = max T j .
Lemma 6 In equilibrium, sup T 1 = sup T 2 = 1.
Proof. Suppose sup T i < 1. By Lemma 5, sup T j = sup T i = p h . By Lemma 4, both …rms cannot have mass points at p h . But, then, at least one …rm sells only to its share of confused consumers at p h and it is clearly better o¤ charging a higher price p = 1. A contradiction.
A.2 Expected Pro…ts Derivation of Firm 1's Expected Pro…t
Suppose …rm 1 chooses a price p 2 [p 0 ; b p 1 ).
Using expression (1), together with (k; k) = 1 and F 2 (b p 2 ) = 2 , we obtain …rm 1's expected pro…t at p = p 0 and when p ! b p 1 ,
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its expected pro…t is
The expected number of confused consumers is the term in square brackets. Firm 1 serves a fraction of this group. Firm 1 also serves the expert consumers if …rm 2 chooses a higher price. With probability F 2 (b p 2 ) F 2 (p), there are (k; k) experts while, with probability 1
, there are ( k; k); this is re ‡ected by the …rst two terms in curly brackets. Recall that @ 2 =@k 1 @k 2 = 0, so 1 (k; k) = (k; k) ( k; k) and, using F 2 (b p 2 ) = 2 , it follows that 1 (p; k) = lim p%b p 1 1 (p; k), as given in (A2). Also, as by Proposition 1, F 2 (b p 1 ) = 1 , the
Suppose …rm 1 chooses a price p 2 (b p 2 ; 1].
Echoing previous reasoning, with probability F 2 (b p 2 ), …rm 2 chooses k, in which case there are (k; k) informed and 1 (k; k) confused consumers. A share of the confused purchases from …rm 1, the prominent seller. The experts do not purchase from …rm 1 as …rm 2's price is lower. With probability 1 F 2 (b p 2 ), …rm 2 chooses k, so there are ( k; k) informed and 1 ( k; k) confused consumers. A share of confused consumers buy from …rm 1. The experts purchase from …rm 1 if it o¤ers a lower price, which happens with probability 1 F 2 (p). The …rst term in curly brackets captures the expected number of experts, while the term in square brackets gives the expected number of confused consumers. As 1
and F 2 (b p 2 ) = 2 , …rm 1's expected pro…t becomes
It can be checked that lim p&b p 2 1 (p; k) = 1 (b p 2 ; k) as presented in (A4).
Derivation of Firm 2's Expected Pro…t
Suppose …rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [p 0 ; b p 1 ).
With probability F 1 (b p 1 ), …rm 1 chooses k, so that there are (k; k) informed and 1 (k; k) confused consumers. A share 1 (< ) of the confused purchases from …rm 2, the less prominent seller. The experts purchase from …rm 2 if …rm 1's price is higher, which happens with probability F 1 (b p 1 ) F 1 (p). With probability 1 F 1 (b p 1 ), …rm 1 chooses k, so there are (k; k) informed and 1 (k; k) confused consumers. All experts purchase from …rm 2 as it o¤ers a lower price (…rm 1 associates k with prices higher than b p 1 ) and so does a share 1 of the confused consumers. The …rst two terms in the curly brackets capture the expected number of experts, whereas the term in square brackets gives the expected number of confused consumers. Using (k; k) = 1 and F 1 (b p 1 ) = 1 , it follows that,
Suppose …rm 2 chooses a price
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, …rm 2's expected pro…t becomes
The logic behind the expression above is similar to the one for (A6), with the di¤erence that when …rm 1 uses k there are (k; k) = 1 informed consumers and when it uses k there are (k; k). Clearly, when …rm 1 uses k, it attracts all the experts, as it o¤ers a lower price. It is easy to check that 2 (b p 1 ; k) = lim p%b p 1 2 (p; k) as given by (A7), and that the expected pro…t
Suppose …rm 2 chooses a price p 2 (b p 2 ; 1].
By Proposition 1, it associates prices in this range with complexity level k. Then, its expected pro…t becomes
A.3 Equilibrium Analysis Price Ratios Using the Firms' Constant Pro…t Conditions
In equilibrium, each …rm i's expected pro…t for any price-complexity combination (p; k i ), which is assigned positive density in equilibrium, must be constant.
Using (A1) -(A4), the constant pro…t conditions for …rm 1 lead to the following price ratios expressed as functions of 2 :
Using (A7) and (A8), the constant pro…t conditions of …rm 2 lead to the following price ratios expressed as functions of 1
Equilibrium Values
In this part, we show that equilibrium 1 is always well de…ned and that 2 is well de…ned when Condition 2 holds. The expression for the 's is given in (2).
(i) First, it is easy to see that 1 < and 2 > 1 as 1 > (1 )(1 (k; k)).
(ii) We now check that i 2 (0; 1).
. This always holds as the RHS is lower than 1 and the LHS larger than 1.
, which always holds as the LHS is always larger than 1.
2 > 0, by the same argument used to show that 1 > 0.
Mass Point at Upper Bound
If both …rms' price c.d.f.s were continuous everywhere (that is, if F 1 (1) = F 2 (1) = 1), then using (A5) and (A9), it would follow that 1 = (2 2 )(1 (k; k)) and 2 = (1 )(2 1 )(1 (k; k)). Then, the lower bounds of the supports would be
The inequality uses the fact that 1 =(1 ) = 2 = . 28 But, this contradicts Lemma 5. Suppose now that …rm 2 had a mass point, so that F 2 (1) < 1. By Lemma 4, it must be that F 1 (1) = 1 2 8 It can then be reduced to 1
]. But as 2 > for 1=2 the RHS is larger than 1, while the LHS is smaller than 1. and …rm 2's pro…t is 2 = (1
So, it must be that …rm 2's price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while …rm 1 has a mass point at p = 1. Then, at p = 1, …rm 1's expected pro…t is it follows that 1 < 1.
I 2 given in (5) is well de…ned. Under Condition 2, as > 1=2, it follows that 2 2 2 + 3 (1 (k; k)) > 0. It is then straightforward that 2 > 0. Noting that 2 < 1 as 1 (1 2 )(1 (k; k)) > 1 (2 )(1 (k; k)) , > 1=2, it follows that 2 < 1.
I The expressions for b p 1 and b p 2 are presented below.
Equilibrium Pricing
Firm 2's c.d.f. is implicitly de…ned by the constant pro…t conditions of …rm 1. These conditions can be written using the expected pro…ts, which are presented in appendix A.2, and the equilibrium pro…t 1 de…ned in (3). There are three di¤erent price ranges to be considered, so that
Below we identify piece-wise the c.d.f., using the equilibrium 2 ; as presented in (2).
For prices in [p 0 ; b p 1 ), the constant pro…t condition of …rm 1 requires
After re-arranging the terms, we obtain
For prices in the middle range [b p 1 ; b p 2 ], the constant pro…t condition is
For prices in the high range (b p 2 ; 1], the constant pro…t condition is,
It is straightforward to check that F 2 (p) is continuous on [p 0 ; 1] and strictly increasing.
To pin down …rm 1's c.d.f. we use the constant pro…t conditions for …rm 2, the expected pro…ts presented earlier in this appendix, and the equilibrium pro…t 2 de…ned in (5). As before, there are three di¤erent price ranges to be considered, so that
.
We proceed to identify piece-wise the c.d.f., substituting the equilibrium 1 ; as presented in (2).
For prices in [p 0 ; b p 1 ), the constant pro…t condition of …rm 2 requires
By re-arranging the terms, we get
It follows that
It is straightforward to check that F 1 (p) is continuous on [p 0 ; 1) and strictly increasing.
Furthermore, …rm 1 has a mass point at p = 1,
A.4 Equilibrium Analysis for High Prominence
In this subsection we focus on a situation where Condition 2 does not hold.
Proof of Proposition 3. When …rm 1 chooses a price
and it follows that 1 (b p h 1 ; k) = b p h 1 . Note that the constant pro…t condition of …rm 1 implies that
It then follows that,
Combining p h 0 = b p h 1 with the constant pro…t condition of …rm 2, we obtain the value for h 1 in the proposition.
When …rm 2 chooses a price p 2 [b p h 1 ; 1), it still uses complexity level k. Then, …rm 2's expected pro…t becomes
By Lemma 4, both …rms cannot have a mass point at p = 1. It can be checked that F h 1 (1) = 1 leads to a contradiction. More precisely, if
and F h 2 (1) < 0, which is not possible. Hence, it must be that …rm 1 has an atom at p = 1 and …rm 2's c.d.f. is continuous on [p h 0 ; 1]. Then, F h 2 (1) = 1 implies that, in equilibrium, b p h 1 = (1 (k; k)) and …rms' pro…ts and p h 0 follow. The mass point in …rm 1's price c.d.f. is
and consistency requires that F h 1 (1) , which is the case whenever
But this is exactly the reverse of Condition 2.
Equilibrium Pricing
To identify …rm 2's c.d.f. we use the constant pro…t conditions for …rm 1. More speci…cally, we use the expected pro…ts presented in section 4, and the equilibrium pro…t h1 de…ned in (6). There are two price ranges to be considered, so that
It is straightforward to check that
To pin down …rm 1's c.d.f. we use the constant pro…t conditions for …rm 2. There are two price ranges to be considered, so that
Suppose now that …rm 2 chooses a price
A.5 The Role of Prominence
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) Suppose that Condition 2 holds and consider the equilibrium in Proposition 2. From (3) and (5), 1 > 2 , (2 1)(1 (k; k)) > 0 which holds for > 1=2.
Suppose now that Condition 2 does not hold and consider the equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Using (6), it is easy to see that h1 > h2 .
(ii) Suppose that Condition 2 holds. Let us inspect the equilibrium price c.d.f.s in appendix
, and so the price of the prominent …rm …rst order stochastically dominates that of the less prominent …rm. Suppose that Condition 2 does not hold. Let us inspect the equilibrium price c.d.f.s in appendix A.4.
Consider …rst prices
, and so the price of the prominent …rm …rst order stochastically dominates that of the less prominent …rm.
(iii) The ranking of the average prices follows from (ii) as E(
(1 F i (p i ))dp i + p 0 when Condition 2 holds and E(p i ) = R 1
)dp i + p h 0 when Condition 2 does not hold.
(iv) Recall that when Condition 2 holds 1 = (1 )= 2 , so 1 < 2 , > (1 )(1 + 2 )(1 (k; k)) which holds for > 1=2. When Condition 2 does not hold, it is easy to see from Proposition (3) that
Proof of Corollary 2. First let us compare the cut-o¤ prices. Suppose Condition 2 holds. Using (A10) and (A11) in appendix A.2, we can check that b
The last inequality follows from the fact that, for 2 (:5; 1), all the terms in the numerator are positive, while the denominator is positive (the last term is clearly positive, while the sum of the …rst two is also positive as (1 (k; k)) 1=2).
If Condition 2 does not hold, …rm 2 uses k for all prices on [p h 0 ; 1] and b
Next we compare the …rms' average prices conditional on using the lowest complexity level.
Suppose Condition 2 holds. F 2 is continuous on
F 1 is continuous on [p 0 ; 1), but has an atom at p = 1, = (2 1) (1 (k; k))= [1 (1 2 )(1 (k; k))]. Using the price c.d.f.s in appendix A.2, we can show that
. This is because
where the inequality follows from the fact that b p 1 < b p 2 and F 2 is a well-de…ned c.d.f. Putting together the expressions above, it follows that
Finally, note that
(1 F 1 (p j p < b p 1 ))dp p 0 and
It is then easy to see that
Suppose now that Condition 2 does not hold.
Using the price c.d.f.s in appendix A.4, we can show that
and an argument similar to the one above applies as b p h 1 < 1 and h > 0.
A.6 Expected Pro…ts with Biased Experts Existence of a Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Suppose …rm 2 uses a mixed strategy b 2 . Then, the expected pro…t of …rm 1 when choosing a price p 1 and price complexity k 1 against …rm 2's mixed strategy is
The f.o.c. of the expected pro…t maximization problem w.r.t. k 1 is
where the equivalence follows from @ 2 (k 1 ; k 2 )=@k 1 @k 2 = 0. As @ =@k 1 < 0, we obtain
where the threshold price
2 , the support of F b 2 . Suppose …rm 1 uses a mixed strategy b 1 . Then, the expected pro…t of …rm 2 when choosing a price p 2 and price complexity k 2 against …rm 1's mixed strategy is
A similar argument leads to the following result
where the threshold price b p b 2 is implicitly de…ned by
Expected Pro…ts and Constant Pro…t Conditions
In this part, we present the expected pro…t expressions which underlie example 4 in section 5: To do so, we adapt the main analysis to capture expert consumers' bias towards the prominent …rm's product.
; it associates this price with complexity level k. Then, its expected pro…t is
This expression is similar to (1), but biased expert consumers purchase from …rm 1 if …rm 2's price is higher than p d. Evaluating it at p 2 0 + d and when
i and
where we use 1
If …rm 1 chooses p 2 [b p b 1 ; 1), it associates this price with complexity level k. Then, its expected pro…t is
As before this expression follows from adapting (A3) to re ‡ect the fact that …rm 1 serves (k; k) experts whenever the rival chooses the lowest complexity and a price higher than p d.
Evaluating this expression at b p b 1 and using
The constant pro…t conditions of …rm 1 lead to the following equations where (1 F b 1 (1)) 0 (if the inequality is strict, then …rm 1 has a mass point at p = 1). Finally, if …rm 2 chooses p = 1, it associates this price with k and its expected pro…t is The constant pro…t conditions of …rm 1 lead to the following equations 2 . These can be used to identify …rms' pro…ts, and price c.d.f.s. For expositional simplicity, we focus on a case where ( k; k) = 0. As (k; k) = 1, under the assumption that @ 2 =@k 1 @k 2 = 0, this implies that (k; k) = 1=2.
Example 4 Let (k; k) = 1, (k; k) = :5, and ( k; k) = 0. Suppose = :7 and d = :1. There exists an equilibrium where …rms 1 and 2 choose k with probability 2 )dp +
2 )dp = :6 .
Like in the benchmark model, consumers' bias in favor of the prominent …rm is consistent with the average prices, conditional on these being associated with the lowest complexity level, k.
This is the case although, when the experts are willing to pay a prominence premium, the prominent …rm's lowest possible price is strictly larger than that of its rival. In example 4, the experts never pay more than p 2 = 1 d for the less prominent product. The equilibrium there is consistent with an environment where prominence-biased experts are willing to pay up to v 1 = 1 for the prominent product but no more than v 2 = 1 d for the less prominent one.
Example 4 also highlights some di¤erences from the benchmark model with unbiased experts. In particular, with biased experts, in the mixed strategy equilibrium both …rms may have a mass point at the monopoly price and the less prominent …rm sets this price with higher probability than the rival (i.e., in the example 1 F b 1 (1) = :355 and 1 F b 2 (1) = :3). Although there is a positive probability of a tie at price p = 1, the less prominent …rm cannot improve its market share by slightly undercutting and neither can the rival. So, the reasoning in Lemma 4 does not apply when d > 0. Moreover, the supports of the price c.d.f.s are not identical and the c.d.f. of the less prominent …rm has a gap.
A full characterization of the equilibria in the model with biased experts is beyond the scope of this section. However, there are also other equilibria. For instance, if d >d = [1 (1 )(1 (k; k))], there exists a pure strategy equilibrium where k 1 = k, k 2 = k, and p 1 = p 2 = 1. Firms' pro…ts are then 1 (k; k) = 1 (1 )(1 (k; k)) and 2 (k; k) = (1 )(1 (k; k)). Given these equilibrium prices, …rm 1 (…rm 2) cannot increase its market share by increasing k 1 (decreasing k 2 ). If …rm 2 deviates to p d 2 = (1 ") (1 d) and k 2 2 [k; k), its deviation pro…t is d 2 = (1 ")[1 (1 (k; k 2 )))] and d 2 > 2 (k; k) i¤ " < 1 (1 )(1 (k; k))=[1 (1 (k; k 2 ))] d . Consistency requires d < ". So if d >d, @ " s.t. d 2 > 2 (k; k 2 ) for k 2 2 [k; k).
